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Abstract 
 
We make a case for the usefulness of an optimal control approach for the central 
banks’ choice of interest rates in inflation target regimes.  We illustrate with data 
from selected developed and emerging countries with longest experience of inflation 
targeting. 
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 l. Introduction 
 
Inflation targeting is now a new gold standard for central banks.  The regime is 
believed to perform better than, for instance, the alternative of controlling money for 
clamping down on inflation by giving monetary policy more transparency and thus 
credibility (Svensson, 1997; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007).  Instead of trying 
to meet monetary targets, central banks use their own money to determine short-term 
interest rates and thus control inflation directly.  Tethering inflationary expectations 
is vital under this regime.  If agents believe that the inflation target will be hit, then 
inflationary shocks will be absorbed. 
The 1990s were favorable to low inflation regardless of inflation targeting 
(Masson et al., 1997).  And the case for inflation targeting is not that straightforward 
for emerging market countries.  This is so because of their fragile institutions 
(Eichengreen, 2002; Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Mishkin, 2004), excess liabilities in 
foreign currency, and high degree of passthrough (Eighengreen, 2002).  Exchange 
rate depreciation size also matters in such countries (Eichengreen, 2002) in that it 
might cause a nonlinear impact on output, as in Aghion et al. (1999) and Krugman 
(2003).  Yet by 2005 eight developed markets and thirteen emerging countries had 
adopted inflation targeting; coincidentally or not, inflation was tamed in such 
countries (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). 
Another appeal of inflation targeting is its consistency with Taylor rule and 
thus its supposed advantage over a fixed exchange rate anchor to monetary policy 
(Eichengreen, 2002; Masson et al., 1997).  Yet mixing inflation targeting with 
flexible exchange rates is not always feasible (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  Inflation 
targeting has also been linked to a more favorable inflation-unemployment tradeoff 
 (Clifton et al., 2001; Clarida et al., 1999).  But the regime can also create more 
nominal rigidity and thus worsen the inflation-unemployment tradeoff in the 
presence of low inflation and longer-term contracts (Posen, 1998; Hutchison and 
Walsh, 1998). 
This paper will make a case for the usefulness of optimal control analysis for 
the central banks’ choice of interest rates in inflation target regimes.  We will employ 
a central bank reaction function considering the Taylor rule within a framework of 
optimal control (Chow, 1975).  The model will select the inflation-targeting interest 
rate as a solution to the minimization of the central bank’s loss function subject to the 
behavior of output, inflation, and exchange rate changes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will present our 
model.  Section 3 will present data.  Section 4 will perform analysis.  And section 5 
will conclude. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
 
Now we present an optimal control model that builds on the Taylor rule model of 
Eichengreen (2002).  Eichengreen’s model tracks the major features of open 
emerging markets, and can be described by equations (1)–(3). 
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where π  and *π  are inflation rate and inflation rate target respectively, Y Y−  is 
output deviation from its natural level, e  is the nominal exchange rate (dollar price 
of a country’s currency), i , *i , and i′  are domestic, foreign, and neutral interest rate 
respectively, ε  and η  are disturbance terms, and ν  is a financial disturbance 
(Calvo’s shock). 
Equation (1) is the expectational Phillips curve, and equation (2) is aggregate 
demand for an open economy.  The interest rate impact on output is captured by 
parameter 2α  (and indirectly through 3α ).  Equation (3) is uncovered interest parity, 
where 1( )tE e +  is assumed to be constant when deriving the Taylor rule. 
High degree of passthrough is tracked by both a big 2β  and a small 3α  
because these values mean that exchange rate depreciation causes rapid increase in 
domestic and tradable prices, decreased competitiveness, and then low effect on 
output.  Excess liabilities in foreign currency can also be represented by a small 3α .  
If 3α  is small (and positive) the central bank has less fear of floating.  Yet a big 
depreciation means a negative 3α , and this increases the fear of floating. 
 The solution to the model above is an interest rate reaction function.  We 
suggest that such a reaction function will result from the minimization of the central 
bank’s loss function.  The loss function (4) is minimized over ten periods subject to a 
system of equations representing the behavior of output, inflation, and exchange rate 
changes, i.e. 
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where 0E W  is the loss function (given the values of output, inflation, and exchange 
rate changes at 0t = ), and 1,tµ  and 2,tµ  are the costs of not reaching the more 
desirable output level *tY  and the inflation target respectively.  Equation (5) shows 
output path as a function of the interest rate.  Both equations (5) and (6) are quite 
standard (e.g. Svensson, 1997) but consider desirable output rather than deviation 
from natural output (Romer, 2001).  Equation (7) comes from uncovered interest 
parity and a first-difference autoregressive model (Muinhos et al., 2002).  By 
rewriting 1 0 1( ) ( )
f
t t t t t tE e e i i u+ − = δ + δ − +  in first differences and considering 
[ ] 11)( ++ ∆=∆ tttt eEeE  one gets 1 1 ( )ft t t t tE e e i i+∆ − ∆ = δ ∆ − .  Inserting rule for 
expectations formation 1 1 1 2 1 1( )
f
t t t t tE e e+ − − −∆ = γ ∆ + γ π − π  into the first-difference 
equation produces *1 1 1 2 1 1( ) ( )
f f
t t t t t t te e i i− − −∆ = γ ∆ − δ ∆ − + γ π − π + ε .  The latter can then 
be further simplified to generate equation (7). 
 The solution to the problem is the interest rate reaction function (8), i.e. 
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where 1, 2, 3, 4,t t t t tG θ θ θ θ =         .  Reaction functions for each of the ten periods obtain 
after reckoning 10 9 1, ,...,G G G  and 10 9 1, ,...,g g g  by differentiating Lagrangean 
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Matrices tA  and tC , and vector tb  are the parameters of equations (5), (6), and (7) 
in their reduced form, and are assumed to be constant.  Equation (9) refers to the 
minimization of loss function 1 ( ) ( )2 t t t t tW y a K y a′= − −∑  subject to equations 
(5), (6), and (7) rewritten as a first-order difference equation system, i.e. 
 tttttt bxCyAy ++= −1 .  And W  is loss function (4) in matrix notation for tK  and 
ta . 
 By differentiating (9) with respect to tx , ty , and tλ , and considering only the 
deterministic part of (5), (6), and (7), one can get 10 9 1, ,...,G G G  and 10 9 1, ,...,g g g  
using (Chow, 1975) 
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and 
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where tt KH =  and ttt aKh =  for 10t = .  One advantage for a central bank to 
employ reaction function (8) is that it can choose the best interest rate by considering 
its effects in several subsequent periods.  Another advantage of the optimal control 
approach is to allow one to calibrate the theoretical model with econometric 
estimates of the parameters in tA , tC , and tb . 
 
3. Data 
 
We took a sample of developed and emerging countries with longest experience of 
inflation targeting.  They are the United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CAN), New 
Zealand (NZL), and Sweden (SWE).  The emerging countries are Chile (CHI), 
Poland (POL), Czech Republic (CZE), and Korea (KOR).  The quarterly data for the 
 variables in equations (5)–(7) as well as ti  were taken from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics.  The data range is from 1990–Q1 to 2005–Q1.  Our aim is to 
estimate such equations and parameters, and then get the interest rate reaction 
function. 
For output we considered real GDP.  We used the GDP implicit price deflator 
and made 2000:Q1 1=  in order to get real GDP from nominal GDP.  For inflation we 
took changes in the producer price index, apart from Chile where the consumer price 
index was taken.  For exchange rate changes we considered the closing quotes.  For 
interest rate we considered the money market rate, apart from the UK, Sweden, and 
Chile.  For the UK and Sweden we took the government bond yield, and for Chile we 
considered the discount rate. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
Tables 1–3 show the estimates for equations (5)–(7) using ordinary least squares.  
This can be justified because there is no interdependence between the endogenous 
variables.  Put another way, each equation presents a one-way causal relationship.  
Disturbances tε , tη , and tν  were found contemporaneously unrelated.  We also 
checked for autocorrelation in residuals employing Breusch-Godfrey’s LM test.  
Presence of autocorrelation was corrected by Cochrane-Orcutt estimation. 
 Coefficient 3α  is absent from Table 1, i.e. exchange rate changes were not 
statistically significant.  The output response to ti  was stronger for the UK, Sweden, 
and Poland.  And the coefficient values in Tables 1–3 show that it makes no 
difference whether a country is developed or not.  The coefficient of passthrough (i.e. 
 that of 1t−π ) is higher for the emerging countries (Table 2), but even for this set of 
countries the values vary a great deal. 
 Table 4 and 5 show the central banks’ reaction functions reckoned by Chow 
(1975) methodology.  The coefficients of matrix tG  were quite similar for the ten 
periods, and then we display those for two periods only.  The values of tG  were not 
influenced by either output target, inflation target, or the initial conditions.  To 
calculate matrices 10 9 1, ,...,g g g  we set both output and inflation target at 0.5 percent 
per quarter (~ 2 percent a year); this figure is based on the rationale presented in 
Fischer (1996).  For the initial conditions we took the endogenous variables’ values 
at 2005:Q1.  We also assumed that the central banks do not change the penalties for 
output and inflation deviation from the target, which means assuming 1,tµ  and 2,tµ  
constant for the ten quarters.  The F test in Table 4 shows that the countries are 
similar regarding the sensibility of the optimal interest rate to inflation and exchange 
rate.  The observed F is less than the tabulated value of 5.99 (5 percent significant).  
The results in Table 4 also depend critically on 2α . 
 Having found the reaction functions, we then applied optimal control analysis 
(and loss function (4)) to get the paths of output and inflation deviation.  The paths 
allow one to assess the performance of a country regarding the chosen target.  Chow 
methodology suggests decomposing (4) into one deterministic and one stochastic 
part.  For convenience, here we consider the deterministic part only.  The 
deterministic loss function can be found by rewriting (4) as 
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where tY  and tπ  are meant that we dropped tε  and tη  from (1) and (2).  Table 5 
shows the total of deviations for initial conditions 0 0Y Y= , 0 0π = π , and 0 0e e∆ = ∆ .  
The emerging countries were found to deviate more from the target.  (Figures 1 and 2 
show the paths for output and inflation after optimization at 1t = .) 
 The targets were not hit in Figures 1 and 2 because we neglected the 
stochastic part in the loss function.  Targets are only hit when the number of 
variables in the loss function matches the number of instrumental variables.  This 
cannot occur in our model of two variables (output and inflation) and only one 
instrumental variable (interest rate).  Calibrating the inflation weight in the loss 
function (i.e. making 2, 2tµ = ) shows that the countries can approach more closely 
the inflation target at the expense of the output target. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper shows how an optimal control analysis can be employed by central banks 
in their choice of interest rates under inflation target regimes.  Data from selected 
developed and emerging countries with longest experience of inflation targeting were 
taken to illustrate.  We incidentally found that the emerging countries deviate more 
from the target after optimization. 
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Figure 1. Developed countries’ optimal path for GDP and inflation 
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Figure 2. Emerging countries’ optimal path for GDP and inflation 
 Table 1. GDP behavior (equation (5)) 
Dependent variable: tY  
Coefficient (t-statistic) 
UK CAN NZL SWE CHI POL CZE KOR 
 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1996:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1994:Q4− 
2005:Q1 
1994:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
Intercept 0.317** 0.019* 0.021* 0.695*** 0.136* 0.724*** 0.261*** 0.204*** 
 (2.622) (1.719) (1.728) (4.918) (1.737) (4.053) (2.829) (3.178) 
 
1tY −  0.751*** 0.994*** 0.997*** 0.408*** 0.894*** 0.425*** 0.772*** 0.854*** 
 (7.844) (98.686) (94.451) (3.398) (12.927) (3.011) (9.379) (17.107) 
 
ti  −1.171** −0.155** −0.175*** −1.959*** −0.285** −1.060*** −0.208* −0.571*** 
 (−2.189) (−2.818) (−2.912) (−3.951) (−2.059) (−3.030) (−1.694) (−2.766) 
 
R squared 0.833 0.996 0.995 0.995 0.957 0.689 0.821 0.948 
Adjusted R 0.827 0.996 0.995 0.995 0.954 0.671 0.812 0.946 
 
LM test 
1 lag p = 0.901 p = 0.807 p = 0.265 p = 0.097 p = 0.775 p = 0.035 p = 0.592 p = 0.037 
2 lags p = 0.000 p = 0.939 p = 0.513 p = 0.001 p = 0.300 p = 0.067 p = 0.0001 p = 0.005 
 
ARCH 
1 lag p = 0.183 p = 0.816 p = 0.185 p = 0.007 p = 0.150 p = 0.219 p = 0.171 p = 0.723 
White p = 0.255 p = 0.120 p = 0.774 p = 0.270 p = 0.962 p = 0.690 p = 0.036 p = 0.119 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
 Table 2. Inflation behavior (equation (6)) 
Dependent variable: tπ  
Coefficient (t-statistic) 
UK CAN NZL SWE CHI POL CZE KOR 
 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1996:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1994:Q4− 
2005:Q1 
1994:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1− 
2005:Q1 
1t −π  0.517*** 0.276** 0.226** 0.370*** 0.4171** 0.602*** 0.528*** 0.315*** 
 (4.967) (2.626) (2.016) (3.288) (2.725) (8.259) (4.128) (3.661) 
 
te∆  0.029** 0.291*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.038 0.144*** 0.049* 0.183*** 
 (1.817) (5.928) (4.163) (3.741) (1.613) (4.426) (1.969) (8.481) 
 
tY  0.225* 0.367** 0.424*** 0.354** 0.426** 0.411** 0.420** 0.381** 
 (2.562) (2.312) (3.434) (2.266) (2.666) (2.286) (2.634) (2.483) 
 
LM test 
1 lag p = 0.469 p = 0.139 p = 0.938 p = 0.182 p = 0.073 p = 1877 p = 0.417 p = 0.556 
2 lags p = 0.163 p = 0.143 p = 0.783 p = 0.390 p = 0.183 p = 0.132 p = 0.713 p = 0.649 
 
ARCH 
1 lag p = 0.451 p = 0.683 p = 0.037 p = 0.144 p = 0.254 p = 0.149 p = 0.657 p = 0.366 
White p = 0.464 p = 0.908 p = 0.001 p = 0.656 p = 0.487 p = 0.142 p = 0.973 p = 0.000 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 3. Exchange rate changes’ behavior (equation (7)) 
Dependent variable: te∆  
Coefficient (t-statistic) 
UK CAN NZL SWE CHI POL CZE KOR 
 
1990:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1996:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1994:Q4−
2005:Q1 
1994:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1990:Q1−
2005:Q1 
1te −∆  0.169* 0.236* 0.402*** 0.233* 0.286* 0.252 0.295** 0.272** 
 (1.308) (1.852) (3.350) (1.832) (1.763) (1.622) (2.024) (2.141) 
 
LM test 
1 lag p = 0.129 p = 1 p = 0.791 p = 1 p = 0.545 p = 0.123 p = 1 p = 0.134 
2 lags p = 0.011 p = 0.144 p = 0.381 p = 0.109 p = 0.440 p = 0.273 p = 0.926 p = 0.194 
 
ARCH 
1 lag p = 0.839 p = 0.344 p = 0.093 p = 0.007 p = 0.204 p = 0.906 p = 0.791 p = 0.000 
White p = 0.380 p = 0.285 p = 0.094 p = 0.025 p = 0.437 p = 0.543 p = 0.649 p = 0.000 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 Table 4. Optimal interest rate’s reaction function 
Country/Time 
period 
Control 
variable t
G  coefficients tg coefficients 
UK 
10t =  10i =  0.641471 9Y  + 0.094759 9π  + 0.000902 9e∆  −0.819916 
1t =  1i =  0.641471 0Y  + 0.124495 0π  + 0.001291 0e∆  −0.782816 
CAN 
10t =  10i =  6.407052 9Y  + 0.575915 9π  + 0.143332 9e∆  −7.704448 
1t =  1i =  6.407052 0Y  + 0.611910 0π  + 0.161503 0e∆  −7.371434 
NZL          
10t =  10i =  5.677081 9Y  + 0.465871 9π  + 0.084681 9e∆  −6.772567 
1t =  1i =  5.677081 0Y  + 0.483458 0π  + 0.095159 0e∆  −6.455116 
SWE 
10t =  10i =  0.208283 9Y  + 0.059562 9π  + 0.003704 9e∆  −0.246583 
1t =  1i =  0.208283 0Y  + 0.066665 0π  + 0.004485 0e∆  −0.218710 
Average ( 10t = ) 3.233472   0.299027   0.058155  − 
Average ( 1t = ) 3.233472   0.321632   0.065610  − 
 
CHI 
10t =  10i =  3.135002 9Y  + 0.527595 9π  + 0.013838 9e∆  −3.937551 
1t =  1i =  3.135002 0Y  + 0.600539 0π  + 0.017477 0e∆  −3.588953 
POL 
10t =  10i =  0.401215 9Y  + 0.199842 9π  + 0.012103 9e∆  −0.480279 
1t =  1i =  0.401215 0Y  + 0.266527 0π  + 0.018403 0e∆  −0.314516 
CZE 
10t =  10i =  3.712065 9Y  + 0.908564 9π  + 0.025066 9e∆  −3.979941 
1t =  1i =  3.712065 0Y  + 1.126445 0π  + 0.035605 0e∆  −4.629172 
KOR 
10t =  10i =  1.495730 9Y  + 0.184139 9π  + 0.029264 9e∆  −1.893043 
1t =  1i =  1.495730 0Y  + 0.199094 0π  + 0.034180 0e∆  −1.777083 
Average ( 10t = ) 2.186003   0.455035   0.020068  − 
Average ( 1t = ) 2.186003   0.548151   0.026416  − 
 
Variance analysis 
F value ( 10t = )  0.34   0.53   1.21  − 
F value ( 1t = ) 0.34   0.82   1.01  − 
 
 Table 5. Deviations from the target of 2 percent 
annual growth for both GDP and inflation 
( )10 *
1
t t
t
Y Y
=
−∑  ( )10 *
1
t t
t =
π − π∑   
1, 2,1, 1t tµ = µ =  1, 2,1, 1t tµ = µ =
UK −0.096 0.100 
CAN −0.460 0.976 
NZL −0.554 0.998 
SWE −0.613 1.181 
Average −0.431 0.814 
 
CHI −1.348 1.690 
POL −2.168 1.735 
CZE −2.343 2.784 
KOR −0.687 1.250 
Average −1.637 1.865 
 
Variance analysis 
F value 9.052 6.794 
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